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Uncharted Waters
THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY
ON THE HIGH SEAS
In the early morning of June 27, 2005, Captain
Sellathurai Mahalingam was at the helm of the MV Semlow, a
fifty-eight-meter-long cargo ship owned by the Kenya-based
Motaku Shipping Agency.1 The ship, chartered by the United
Nations, was thirty nautical miles off the coast of Somalia and
contained 850 tons of rice for the victims of the December 2004
tsunami.2 Suddenly, three small skiffs appeared, fired at the ship,
and forced it to stop.3 At that point, somewhere between fifteen
and twenty emaciated Somalis armed with pistols, AK-47s, and
rocket-propelled grenade launchers boarded the ship.4 The pirates
looted the captain’s safe and the crewmembers’ valuables and
forced the ship to sail 100 miles northeast to the Somali capital of
Mogadishu.5 There, Captain Mahalingam was forced to call the
ship’s owner and demand a ransom of $500,000.6 Two months
later, the crew, still in captivity, witnessed the hijacking of an
Egyptian ship before the crews of both ships were again forced to
sail elsewhere.7 Finally, the pirates were paid $135,000 ransom,
and all the hostages were released unharmed.8
This horrific scene of raiding, looting, and hostagetaking has become increasingly common across the globe, but
especially in the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali coast.9 The
combination of a failed government in Somalia, a depleted
1

Peter Lehr & Hendrick Lehman, Somalia—Pirates New Paradise, in
VIOLENCE AT SEA: PIRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1, 1-3 (Peter Lehr ed.,
Routledge 2007); Edward Harris, U.S. Navy Muscles In on Old Foe: Pirates; Operations
Off Africa Reflect Growing Threat, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2007, at A19.
2
Lehr & Lehman, supra note 1, at 2.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 3.
8
Id.
9
Abukar Albadri & Edmund Sanders, Somalia’s Pirate Problem Grows More
Rampant, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2008/oct/31/world/fg-pirates31.
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regional fishing industry, and a close proximity to significant
shipping lanes makes the Somali coast a hotbed for pirate
activity.10 Indeed, in a nation with a per-capita GDP of $600
and an average male life expectancy of forty-seven, the
$150,000 payout for a single hijacking is a lucrative alternative
to poverty.11 As one hijacker admitted, “[w]hen evil is the only
solution[,] you do evil.”12 The result has been an explosion of
pirate raids on commercial vessels.13 While multinational naval
forces in the Gulf of Aden thwarted some pirate attacks, there
were a staggering 214 attacks and 74 hijackings in 2009.14 The
number of reported pirate incidents has decreased slightly in
2010.15 Between January and June of 2010, there were 196
reported incidents, compared to 240 over the same period in
2009.16 At any rate, those 196 reported incidents included 31
hijackings, and resulted in 16 injuries, 1 death, and 597
crewmembers taken hostage.17
In addition to the substantial threat to human life,
piracy has cost shipping companies between $13 billion and
$16 billion.18 In 2008 alone, insurance costs for shipping
companies increased ten-fold.19 In December 2009, pirates
claimed they received a $4 million ransom payment from the
Chinese government.20 One maritime security firm explained
that, if left unaddressed, the costs of piracy to shipping
10

Id.
Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast
of Somalia, 13 AM. SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS 2 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.asil.
org/insights090206.cfm.
12
James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law,
40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 43, 44 (2009).
13
Albadri & Sanders, supra note 9.
14
Mark McDonald, Record Number of Somali Pirate Attacks in 2009, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A9 (quoting statistics from the International Maritime
Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center as of Dec. 29, 2009), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/africa/30piracy.html.
15
Pirates Face New Resistance as Navies Strike Back, Says IMB, ICC COM.
CRIME
SERVICES
(July
15,
2010),
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=418:pirates-face-new-resistance-as-navies-strike-backsays-imb&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 [hereinafter Pirates Face New Resistance].
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Kraska & Wilson, supra note 12, at 45.
19
Jerry Seper, Blackwater Joins Fight Against Sea Piracy, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2008, at B1, available at http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/04/
blackwater-joins-fight-against-sea-piracy.
20
Corey Flintoff, A Record Year for Pirate Attacks, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 30,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122066185. The Chinese
government described the return of the ship as a “rescue.” Id.
11
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companies will only increase.21 These costs, including added
danger payments for crew members, higher ransom payments,
and prolonged negotiations for hijacked ships, will lead to
increasing prices for consumers.22 Although these costs are
significant, maritime security commentators warn that pirate
attacks remain too rare to generate meaningful attention from
the governments of the world.23 In fact, less than one percent of
all ships traveling through the Gulf of Aden is attacked by
pirates.24 As such, at least in the short term, it will be left up to
private sector firms to protect their ships, their cargo, their
crew, and their bottom line.
This note will examine two distinct contexts in which the
private sector will have to combat the threat of piracy and the
complex legal framework in which it must operate. Shipping
companies should—and can—minimize the threat of piracy to
commercial vessels while also taking adequate precautions to
prevent both criminal and civil liability. States may also utilize
private security companies to hunt down piracy without diverting
important military resources.
Part I of this note addresses the shortcomings of state
protection against pirates and the need for the private sector to
take a more active role in securing the high seas. Part II examines
the rights and responsibilities of shipping companies in fighting
piracy. Finally, Part III considers the possibility of using private
security contractors to hunt down pirates and the potential
liabilities for these firms.
I.

PUTTING THE BURDEN ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR

A.

Ancient Origins

For centuries, combating piracy was substantially the
prerogative of states.25 Since Ancient Roman times, pirates
were deemed “common enemies of mankind” and were subject
to universal jurisdiction.26 Some of the earliest known legal
references to pirate raids date back to Justinian’s Digest in 529
21

Seper, supra note 19.
Id.
23
See Dennis M. Zogg, Why the U.S. Navy Should Not Be Fighting Piracy off
Somalia (May 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Joint Military
Operations Dep’t, Naval War College).
24
Id.
25
Max Boot, Pirates, Then and Now, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2009, at 94, 99.
26
Id. at 99.
22
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AD.27 In 1698, Great Britain became the first nation to
specifically criminalize piracy.28 The rise of global commerce
and exploration made piracy as relevant as ever.29 As the
Spanish explored and colonized the New World, they sent naval
convoys across the Atlantic twice a year with their acquired
treasures.30 Merchant ships not protected by the fleet sailed at
their own risk.31 One of these ships, seized by Sir Francis
Drake, was worth $18 million in today’s currency.32
The United States, most notably, dealt with piracy in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the North
African Barbary States.33 The pirates, sanctioned by the
Barbary States, posed such a threat to American merchant
ships that the U.S. government entered into agreements to give
ships safe passage in exchange for goods and cash.34 For
example, an agreement made in 1795 transferred $1 million in
goods and cash to the government of Algiers.35
By 1801, President Jefferson recognized that “nothing
will stop the eternal increase of demands from these pirates
but the presence of an armed force.”36 The U.S. Navy fought the
pirates until 1815, when the Barbary States finally agreed to
stop attacking American ships—a concession that had been
made to the British and French decades earlier.37
27

Zou Keyuan, New Developments in International Piracy Law, 8 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 323, 323 (2009); see also 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, Book 13, para. 18 (Alan
Watson ed. 1998).
28
Keyuan, supra note 27, at 323.
29
See Douglass C. North, Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping,
1600-1850, 76 J. POL. ECON. 953 (1968).
30
Keyuan, supra note 27, at 323.
31
Boot, supra note 25, at 100.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 102.
34
Id.
35
Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, 2 U.S.T. 275. The
treaty stated in relevant part:
[I]f war vessels or merchant vessels belonging to our friend the American
ruler meet on the open sea with war vessels or merchant vessels belonging to
Algiers, and they become known to each other, they shall not be allowed to
search or to molest each other, and that none shall hinder the other from
wending its own way with honor and respect. Also, that whatever kind of
travelers there are on board, and wherever they go with their goods, their
valuables, and other properties, they shall not molest each other or take
anything from each other, nor take them to a certain place and hold them up,
nor injure each other in any way.
Id.
36
37

Boot, supra note 25, at 102.
Id.
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Lowering the Ship’s Guard

From the sixteenth to late eighteenth century, adequate
ship defenses were a necessary cost for shipping companies.38
Ships would be armed like warships, with extra personnel and
weaponry to fend off pirate attacks.39 In the early nineteenth
century, these companies began to rethink arming their ships
because of several factors.40 First, as competition among shipping
companies increased during the Industrial Revolution, speed
became a premium, and companies could not afford to weigh
down their ships with ammunition and extra personnel.41
Furthermore, busier shipping lanes patrolled by a strong British
Navy led to a global decline in piracy.42 As a result, ships began
to disarm, carrying fewer personnel and armaments.43 As
Professor Douglass C. North, formerly of the University of
Washington, observed, the increased security of shipping routes
led to a steady decrease in maritime insurance rates, labor costs,
and ammunition costs.44 He further noted that, in areas such as
the West Indies, lingering piracy threats continued to translate
into higher costs to shipping companies.45
Shipping companies’ decisions to disarm their ships in
favor of lower costs and increased efficiency became the norm
from the nineteenth century until recently.46 Except during
wartime, few ships carried armed guards or even ammunition.47
The recent reemergence of pirates as a threat to merchant vessels
has forced shipping companies to once again consider arming
their ships.48 While shipping companies were initially hesitant,
more and more have armed their ships because of the insufficient

38

John W. Miller, Loaded: Freighters Ready to Shoot Across Pirate Bow,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2010, at A9, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB126265833983415885.html.
39
Id.; see also North, supra note 29, at 960.
40
See Miller, supra note 38.
41
Id.
42
Deepak Lal, Will Terrorism Defeat Globalization?, in NO MORE STATES?
GLOBALIZATION, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION, AND TERRORISM 36 (Richard N.
Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 2006).
43
North, supra note 29, at 960.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 959-60.
46
Miller, supra note 38.
47
Id.
48
Id.
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international response to piracy and recent reductions in
insurance premiums for ships that carry armed guards.49
C.

The International Response

The reemergence of piracy, especially the high-profile
taking of the U.S.-flagged MV Maersk Alabama, has drawn
some response from the international community.50 The United
Nations, for example, has passed resolutions on the matter,
and many of the world’s navies have devoted resources to the
Gulf of Aden.51 Despite these measures, pirate attacks remain a
considerable threat.52 As such, shipping companies, particularly
in the short term, must not rely on governmental entities to
keep their ships safe.53
In the Gulf of Aden, warships from the United States,
United Kingdom, Russia, China, India, South Korea, and several
other nations have been deployed to fight piracy.54 For the most
part, these multilateral efforts are controlled by the U.S.
Combined Task Force 151 and the European Union’s Operation
Atalanta.55 The U.S. Navy has established a “Maritime Security
Patrol Area,” a heavily patrolled area that merchant vessels are
encouraged to navigate.56 In addition to military collaboration,
the United Nations has taken a leading role in coordinating
global antipiracy policy through the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).57 The IMO is an United Nations entity with
168 member nations whose mission includes global coordination
“for legal issues, technical co-operation, and maritime security
including anti-piracy efforts.”58
In 2008, the United Nations Security Council (“Security
Council”) passed four resolutions that were significant to
nations fighting piracy.59 Most notably, these resolutions
allowed states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and
49

Id.
See Zogg, supra note 23, at 7-8.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 9-12.
54
Id. at 1.
55
Id. at 8.
56
Id. at 10.
57
LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE
HORN OF AFRICA 18 n.41 (2009).
58
Id.
59
Zogg, supra note 23, at 7.
50
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urged states to commit naval vessels and aircraft to the Somali
region.60 The Security Council’s resolutions certainly laid
important groundwork for nations to combat piracy.61 Still, the
resolutions only “urged” nations to commit resources to the
fight against piracy.62 As Lieutenant Daniel Zogg of the U.S.
Naval War College points out, there is presently little incentive
for nations to do more to fight piracy.63
Lieutenant Zogg suggests that pirate attacks remain a
very rare phenomenon and will not receive the requisite
attention necessary to provide optimal security, especially
without a connection to terrorist groups.64 Less than one
percent of all ships traveling through the world’s hot spot for
piracy is attacked, and the $16 billion lost annually is a drop in
the multi-trillion-dollar bucket that is international shipping.65
The overall effectiveness of naval patrols is a problem in itself.66
Patrol ships must cover 1.1 million square miles of ocean and
must be able to respond to a hijacking within fifteen minutes,

60

Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (June 2, 2008);
S.C. Res. 1838, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 15, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1851 (Dec. 16,
2008)). Zogg summarized the resolutions as such:
UNSCR 1816 (June 2, 2008) authorized . . . [other states] to “enter the
territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea.”
UNSCR 1838 (October 7, 2008) urged “states interested in the security of
maritime activities to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the
high seas off the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels
and military aircraft.”
UNSCR 1846 (December 2, 2008) extended by twelve months the
authorization initially established under UNSCR 1816 for foreign countries
to pursue pirates into Somalia’s territorial waters. It also urged all “parties to
the [1988] SUA [Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation] Convention to fully implement their obligations under
said Convention . . . to build judiciary capacity for the successful prosecution
of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia.”
UNSCR 1851 (December 16, 2008) authorized for a period of twelve months
states to “undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia,”
essentially paving the way for attacks against piracy infrastructure ashore.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 2.
66
Id. at 9.
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the time it generally takes to hijack a ship.67 The Navy has
projected that it would take sixty-one ships to adequately
patrol a small corridor within the pirates’ operational space—a
dramatic increase from the twelve to sixteen ships that
currently patrol the corridor.68 While the current naval
presence in the Gulf of Aden has lead to a slight decrease in
pirate incidents, pirates have proven to increase their
operational capabilities to up to 1000 nautical miles off the
Somali coast, and their reach continues to grow.69 In 2009, the
International Maritime Bureau reported twenty-eight attacks
off the coast of Nigeria,70 and in July 2010, pirates attacks were
reported north of the naval patrols’ reach in the Red Sea.71
In addition to encouraging nations to join the fight
against piracy, the Security Council resolutions made one
mention of shipping companies.72 Resolution 1846 urges
shipping companies, nations, and the International Maritime
Organization to advise ships on “best practices” in dealing with
pirate attacks.73 The International Maritime Bureau—a
nonprofit organization not affiliated with the IMO—suggests
that these practices include:
[R]eview of the ship’s security plan (SSP), crew briefing and drills
regarding emergency measures, an emergency communication plan,
additional security watches, group transits, transits as far from
territorial waters as possible, daytime transits through high-risk
regions, as well as myriad practices in the event that an attack occurs.74

Still, these suggestions are merely guidelines and, like
any Security Council resolution, they are not binding on the
shipping private sector.75 In short, absent a dramatic change in
international policy, shipping companies will retain great
67

Id. Zogg’s 1.1 million square mile figure refers to the area in which the
Somali pirates have displayed operational success. Id.
68
Id. at 11.
69
Pirates Face New Resistance, supra note 15.
70
Jon Gambrell, Nigeria: 12 Foreign Sailors Kidnapped by Pirates,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 3, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/
ALeqM5jFgtdm4PvHOfaFjZnYMcaAmrfvgD9GNJRVG2.
71
Adam Schreck, NATO Fears Somali Pirates Moving to South Red Sea,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 21, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/
ALeqM5gB7YMEDuCwwY9ncDOtPAkEI4-H2wD9H3I9884.
72
Michelle Nakamura, Piracy off the Horn of Africa: What is the Most
Effective Method of Repression? 9 (May 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Joint Military Operations Dep’t, Naval War College).
73
Id. at 9-10.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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responsibility and broad discretion in securing their ships
against pirate attacks.
II.

THE SHIPPING COMPANY

While the international community struggles to craft
policies to stabilize Northern Africa and eradicate piracy, it is
clear that shipping companies will primarily be responsible for
keeping their ships safe. Piracy has cost shipping companies,
cargo owners, and ship owners billions of dollars over the last
decade.76 Pointing out the numerous costs and considerations
facing shipping companies, practitioner D. Joshua Staub writes
in the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce,
If a shipping line must take a route around the Cape of Good Hope
instead of through the Suez Canal, it will incur additional annual
costs of $89 million. War risk insurance premiums for vessels
transiting the Gulf of Aden could reach as much as $400 million
per annum. A Saudi oil tanker forced to travel to the United States
by way of the Cape of Good Hope will reduce its annual delivery
capacity by 26% and expend an additional $3.4 million per year to
bring its payload to market. These examples do not include
emotional damages to hostages and their families, or special
damages from loss of use of impounded vessels, lost cargo, ransom
payments, difficulty in retaining mariners or increased cost of
goods for consumers.77

Shipping companies cannot ignore these observations. As
pirates become stronger, bolder, and acquire more resources,
shipping corporations will continue to pay a high cost of doing
business. The decision to pay ransoms, the hiring of private
security, and the adoption of increased safety precautions
represent three complex legal issues that shipping companies
must face in fighting piracy.
A.

Ransoms

Unlike their predecessors, pirates of the twenty-first
century do not have the capability or the desire to plunder the
cargo of the hijacked ships.78 Their true capabilities lie not in

76

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
D. Joshua Staub, Letters of Marque: A Short Term Solution to an Age Old
Problem, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 261, 262-63 (2009).
78
James W. Carbin, Pirates: Hostis Humanis Generis, 56 FED. L., Sept. 2009,
at 50, 55.
77

352

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

the capture of ships but in the negotiations that follow.79 In fact,
by 2009, ransoms paid for the release of cargo and crew
approached $50 million.80 These payments have become so
commonplace that they are factored into the general
calculation of a ship’s liability.81 Like other liabilities, ransom
payments are paid from a ship’s general average.82 The recent
spike in piracy has required some carriers, cargo owners, and
others who contribute to a ship’s general average to seek
additional protection through insurance.83 Kidnapping and
ransom (“K&R”) policies are now being extended to ships and
their crew with rates increasing substantially.84 The payment of
ransoms has become not only a general practice for shipping
companies, but also a business in itself.85
Ransom payments by private parties to pirates remains
legal practice in countries such as the United States and Great
Britain.86 The British legal system acknowledged the payment
of ransoms as early as 1590.87 In Hicks v. Palington Moore’s, the
court held that a ransom paid voluntarily by a master to
ransom a ship and its cargo can and should be paid from the
ship’s general average.88 Similarly, in the American legal
tradition, James Carbin, a maritime law practitioner who
advises shipping companies on paying pirate ransoms, points
out, “The U.S. Supreme Court cited [Hicks] with approval in
Ralli v. Troop . . . , and subsequent authorities have followed
the analysis. Indeed, the Digest of Justinian, Rhodian Law,
and Consolado Del Mare, which cover the sixth through the
[fifteenth] centuries A.D., appear to endorse ransom as a
General Average expense.”89

79

Id.
Id. at 54.
81
Id.
82
Jonathan Spencer, Hull Insurance and General Average—Some Current
Issues, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1261 (2009). The doctrine of General Average is defined
as “a rule allowing a carrier to require cargo owners and the shipowner to contribute
pro rata to the cost of protecting the ship and its cargo.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 518
(8th ed. 2004).
83
Spencer, supra note 82, at 1260.
84
Id. at 1259.
85
Id. at 1259-60.
86
See Fred C. Ikle & Stephen G. Rademaker, Coddling Pirates Aids
Terrorists, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/
jan/11/coddling-pirates-aids-terrorists.
87
Hicks v. Palington, (1590) 72 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.).
88
Id.
89
Carbin, supra note 78, at 54 (citation omitted).
80
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While paying ransoms has become common practice,
commentators have indicated that refraining from doing so
could actually deter piracy.90 Following the capture of a Saudi
supertanker in November 2008, British Foreign Secretary
David Miliband stated,
There is a strong view of the British Government, and actually the
international community, that payments for hostage-taking are only
an encouragement to further hostage-taking and we will be
approaching this issue in a very delicate way, in a way that puts the
security and safety of the hostages to the fore.91

Former American policymakers Fred C. Ikle and Stephen G.
Rademaker suggest an international regime to prevent
payment of pirate ransoms.92 They point to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1373, which outlaws any financial
support to terrorists and terrorist organizations.93 Of course,
this ban, along with the American policy of not negotiating
with terrorists, applies only to state actors.94 As the U.S.
Department of State makes clear, “U.S. Government policy is
to make no concessions to terrorist demands. However, such a
decision on the part of private individuals or companies is a
personal one and in some special circumstances may be made
by the family or company of the victim.”95 Thus, companies, as
private actors, can choose whether to pay the ransoms.96
On its face, an international ban on paying pirate
ransoms seems to be an important step in combating piracy.97
Still, there are several problems with such a policy. Most
strikingly, the payment of ransoms often makes good business
90

See, e.g., Ikle & Rademaker, supra note 86; Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, A
Sure-Fire Cure for Pirate Hijackings, CNBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.
cnbc.com/id/30109142.
91
Xan Rice & Matthew Weaver, Sirius Star Pirates Demand $25m Ransom,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/20/piracy-somalia;
see also Brent Lang, Gates: Stop Paying Ransom to Pirates, CBS NEWS (Apr. 17, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/04/17/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry4952864.shtml
(reporting on United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ speech to the United
States Naval War College in which he referred to corporations paying pirate ransoms
as “part of the problem”).
92
Ikle & Rademaker, supra note 86.
93
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
94
The United States Department of State re-affirmed this posture in a report
by its Overseas Security Advisory Council. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OVERSEAS SEC.
ADVISORY COUNCIL, SECURITY AWARENESS OVERSEAS: AN OVERVIEW (1991), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19792.pdf.
95
Id. at 13-14.
96
Id. at 14.
97
See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 10-11.
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sense for a corporation.98 As the Congressional Research Service
points out, shipping corporations today will often secure
insurance policies that will cover ransom payments in the
event of a hijacking.99 As such, these costs may be considerably
lower than the cost of securing a vessel against pirate attacks.100
Such costs could include rerouting ships, arming the vessel,
and hiring private security.101 Defending the ship or counting on
naval assistance also greatly increases the risk to the cargo and
to human life.102 However, to date, few pirate attacks in the Gulf
of Aden have turned deadly.103 Among the most notable
casualties was the owner of a French sailboat who was killed in
a gunfight between pirates and the French Navy.104
Furthermore, the negotiated ransom is often minute compared
to the substantial value of a ship’s cargo.105 The owners of the
aforementioned supertanker, MV Sirius Star (carrying oil
valued at $100 million), agreed to pay a ransom of $3 million to
the pirates.106
As such, in the short term, many shipping companies
will continue to consider paying pirate ransoms.107 However, as
the Wall Street Journal points out, increases in pirate attacks,
ransom amounts, and insurance costs have forced many
companies to reconsider defending their ships.108 More and
more, companies are looking to private security and additional
safety measures instead of acquiescing to the pirates.109
B.

Hiring Private Security
1. A Growing Industry

Though the threat of piracy is a danger, it has not
escalated to a point that would dramatically increase naval

98

Id. at 11.
Id. at 10-11.
100
Id. at 11.
101
Id. at 10-11.
102
Id. at 11.
103
Id. at 8.
104
Id. at 9.
105
Id. at 11; Miller, supra note 38.
106
See supra note 78 and accompanying text; Saudi Tanker ‘Freed Off
Somali,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7820311.stm.
107
Miller, supra note 38.
108
Id.
109
Id.
99
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presence in the Gulf of Aden.110 As such, shipping companies have
increasingly relied on private contractors to provide security for
their ships and cargo.111 The U.S. State Department observed that
“[i]n appropriate circumstances, onboard armed security, private
or military, can provide an effective deterrent to pirates in the
Horn of Africa region for certain vessels deemed to be at high
risk.”112 Professor Claude Berube of the U.S. Naval Academy
theorizes that private contractors may be used in two distinct
contexts.113 First, private contractors can be hired by shipping
companies to provide security on board their ships.114 Second,
private contractors can be commissioned by the government to
hunt down pirates.115 The former is quickly becoming a common
practice for pirate-plagued shipping companies.116
While some states have resorted to placing naval
personnel on private ships, most shipping companies have
turned to private security contractors.117 This practice is far
from new.118 In the days of the British Empire, the British East
India Company regularly subcontracted the protection and
transport of goods to armed merchant ships.119 In the twentyfirst century, an entire industry is devoted to maritime
security.120 Among the companies in this growing industry is
110

See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
Splashing, and Clashing, in Murky Waters: Piracy and Private Enterprise,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 2009, at 53. [hereinafter Splashing, and Clashing].
112
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Claude Berube, Blackwaters for the Blue Waters: The Promise of Private
Naval Companies, 51 ORBIS 601, 607, 609 (2007).
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Id. at 609.
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Id. at 608. See infra Part III for a discussion of private pirate hunters.
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Miller, supra note 38. Many shipping companies have been advocating the
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armed military escorts for its ships. Currently, the Department of Defense has declined
to provide individual escorts for American-flagged ships. See Piracy Against United
States-Flag Vessels: Lessons Learned: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard &
Mar. Transp. of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 2 (2009)
(statement of the American Maritime Officers; International Organization of Masters,
Mates, & Pilots; Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association; and Seafarers International
Union), available at http://transportation.house.gov/Media/file/Coast%20Guard/2009
0520/industry%20testimony.pdf; Id. (statement of Arthur J. Volkle, Jr., Vice President
of American Cargo Transport, Inc.), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/
Testimony-Arthur_Volkle,Jr-American_Cargo_Transport.pdf [hereinafter Volkle Statement]
(“Historically, the primary mission of the Navy has been the protection of U.S. merchant
shipping, and we believe that that mission is as important today as it was when the Navy
responded to the last major threat of piracy against our ships 200 years ago.”).
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See Splashing, and Clashing, supra note 111.
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Berube, supra note 113, at 611.
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Splashing, and Clashing, supra note 111.
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British-based Eos Risk Management, which claims to have
fended off fifteen attacks between January and August of
2009.121 Eos, like most private contractors, employs ex-military
personnel, often with strong naval experience.122 Their
personnel is instructed to use non-lethal defenses, such as earpiercing acoustic weaponry and high-pressured water hoses, to
repel pirate attackers.123 Security companies are hesitant to use
lethal force, because it could cause pirates to better arm
themselves and thus escalate hostilities.124 Moreover, as the
United Kingdom-based Olive Group explained, pirate contacts
in African ports can warn their comrades of which ships have
security and should be avoided.125 Many firms share the view of
Virginia-based Securewest International that the mere
presence of contractors can scare away pirates.126 While this
view has been the norm, more companies are considering the
presence of armed guards.127
Following its high-jacking in April 2009, the MV Maersk
Alabama turned to an armed security team.128 Only seven
months later, the ship was again attacked 300 miles off the
Somali coast.129 This time, the contractors were able to
successfully repel the attack.130 Slow, bulky ships, like the MV
Maersk Alabama, are coming to realize that armed guards are
an effective option.131 Insurance companies are providing
further incentive.132 Companies such as Hiscox, Ltd. are offering
fifty-percent reductions in shipping-company insurance rates to
those that contract for armed security.133 In fact, these trends
have led to new strategic partnerships between insurance
brokers and maritime security firms. One of the world’s largest
121
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Id. France-based Secoplex and California-based RSB International are also
providing security on ships in East Africa and Southeast Asia. Id.
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http://www.securewest.com/pg/case_study_3.ikml (last visited Oct. 3, 2010); Private
Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali Pirates, FOX NEWS (Oct. 26, 2008),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,444103,00.html.
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insurance brokers, Marsh, has partnered with maritime security
firm, REDfour, offering clients discounts in both insurance
coverage and security services, when purchased together.134
Blackwater Worldwide,135 which came to prominence for
its controversial role in providing security services for the
United States in Iraq, has also found opportunity in armed
security.136 Rather than provide armed guards on merchant
vessels, the company purchased and retro-fitted an 183-foot
research vessel with “state-of-the-art navigation systems,”
advanced communication systems, helicopters, a hospital, and
a highly trained crew of forty-five.137 The ship, named the
MacArthur, will offer patrols and security for its clients in lieu
of armed guards aboard the merchant vessel.138
The U.S. Maritime Administration, within the
Department of Transportation, recently released an advisory
that makes several recommendations when considering the use
of private security forces.139 Most significantly, shipping
companies must consider the legality of having armed security
forces aboard and bringing them into foreign ports.140 Under
American law, shipping companies are permitted to employ
armed guards on ships. Section 383 of title 33 of the United States
Code, titled “Resistance of Pirates by Merchant Vessels,” states,
The commander and crew of any merchant vessel of the United
States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose

134

Press Release, Marsh and REDfour Team to Help Shipowners Address
Risks Associated With Piracy Attacks in Gulf of Aden (Oct. 9, 2009), available at
http://global.marsh.com/news/press/pr20091009.php. Eos Risk Management has also
partnered with kidnap and ransom insurance firms and has launched a “High Risk
Premium Discount Programme.” The program similarly purports to give shipping
companies a 50% discount on insurance premiums. Press Release, Leading Insurer
Reduces High Risk Transit Premiums for Eos Clients (Jan. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.eosrisk.com/news.php?Leading-Insurer-Reduces-High-Risk-Transit-Premiumsfor-Eos-Clients&news_id=1254348236.
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In 2009, Blackwater Worldwide changed its name to “Xe” in an effort to
shift its business focus. Dana Heddgpeth, Blackwater Sheds Name, Shifts Focus,
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/02/13/AR2009021303149_pf.html. For ease of reference, the company and its
subsidiaries will be referred to as “Blackwater” henceforth.
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Seper, supra note 19.
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Advisory, U.S. Maritime Admin., Maritime Advisory 2009-07 (Sept. 9, 2009),
available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/new_room_landing_page/maritime_advisories/
advisory/advisory2009-07.htm.
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Id. In the United States, there is no express ban on armed personnel
aboard a ship. In fact, the advisory suggests that ship owners consider using armed
and unarmed guards. Id. ¶ 7(d).
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and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or
seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any
other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any armed
vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation in
amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the
same; and may also retake any vessel so owned which may have
been captured by the commander or crew of any such armed vessel,
and send the same into any port of the United States.141

The U.S. Supreme Court examined this statute in the classic
piracy case, The Marianna Flora.142 Writing for the Court,
Justice Story held that “[p]irates may, without doubt, be
lawfully captured on the ocean by the public or private ships of
every nation; for they are, in truth, the common enemies of all
mankind, and, as such, are liable to the extreme rights of
war.”143 Other nations, including Spain, have also passed laws
that explicitly allow ships to carry armed guards.144 Meanwhile,
nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia have outlawed the use
of armed guards and have stated that these guards would be
subject to arrest if found in territorial waters.145 Armed guards
traveling through the territorial waters of Singapore are
required to disassemble and lock their weapons.146 While hiring
armed guards is becoming a more accepted practice, shipping
companies face three legal hurdles in employing armed
guards—weapons exportation laws, command and control
issues, and potential liability for defending the ship.
2. Regulation of Armed Guards
a. “Weapons Trafficking”
While their cargo might not be weaponry, ships carrying
armed guards are subject to both international and domestic
weapons-trafficking laws.147 Because shipping companies have
increasingly turned toward private contractors, the U.S. Coast
141

33 U.S.C. § 383 (2006).
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826).
143
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
144
Martin Roberts, Spain Allows Armed Guards on Ships in Danger Zones,
REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLU707043.
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Asia 6-7 (Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 120, 2005), available at http://
wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp120.pdf.
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Id. at 7.
147
Port Security Advisory (4-09)(rev 2), United States Coast Guard, Restrictions
for U.S.-Flagged Vessels (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.simsl.com/Loss-Prevention/
USCGPSA409Rev2.pdf [hereinafter Nov. 4, 2009 Port Security Advisory].
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Guard (“Coast Guard”) has issued an advisory about
compliance with American firearms laws.148 While armed
guards are not “importing” and “exporting” their firearms to be
sold in port, American flagged vessels must comply with
American domestic law, including the Gun Control Act of
1968149 and the National Firearms Act,150 as well as the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) set forth by
the Departments of State and Justice.151 Shipping companies
can comply by applying for a temporary export license, which
allows the ship to import and export approved weapons for a
four-year period and does not permit the transfer of weapons to
other individuals.152 Armed guards could also carry their
weapons under a personal-use exception of ITAR; however, this
alternative severely limits the quantity of guns and
ammunition that could be carried, and the exception would
need to be reissued upon each entry.153
Still, as the Coast Guard admits, this is far from the
only obstacle to importing weapons.154 In addition to American
law, shipping companies must comply with state and local laws
as well as the laws of foreign ports.155 In testifying before the
House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, Arthur J. Volkle, Jr., Vice President of
America Cargo Transport, Inc.,156 explained that varying
restrictions and prohibitions in domestic and foreign ports
creates a significant burden on shipping companies.157
Domestically, Volkle points out that temporary export permits
are “impossible” to get, as they require authorization from all of
the ports to which the ship will be traveling.158 As a result,
vessels have the burden of constantly applying for personal
effects exemptions for each of their armed guards.159
Internationally, the lack of uniformity in the rules and

148
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18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931 (2006).
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5822 (2006).
Nov. 4, 2009 Port Security Advisory, supra note 147.
Id.
Id.; see also 22 C.F.R. § 123.17 (2009) (the ITAR personal use exception).
Nov. 4, 2009 Port Security Advisory, supra note 147.
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America Cargo Transport Corp. is a United States-based shipping company.
Volkle Statement, supra note 116, at 2-5.
Id. at 3.
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regulations of foreign ports overburdens the companies, and
regulatory violations can delay the unloading of a vessel.160
To address these problems, Volkle advocates several
policy recommendations. Most notably, the United States,
according to Volkle, should broker agreements with foreign
governments that set forth uniform rules for the entry of ships
with armed guards.161 In the interim, the United States should
provide a clear list of the various requirements of foreign states
for the entry of arms.162 Finally, Volkle asserts that there
should be new regulations and procedures for licensing private
security contractors and allowing them to carry firearms on
board.163 These are worthwhile recommendations that would
better equip the private sector to combat piracy while not
requiring further commitment of military assets.
b. Command and Control
Once the private contractors are on the vessel, for whom
do they work? As most advocates for arming merchant ships
would agree, shipping companies do not want to arm their own
crews, but instead hire a private, third party to defend their
ships.164 As such, there is currently some ambiguity in exactly
who is in control of the private contractors once the vessel is at
sea.165 In choosing to deploy their weapons, contracts with
private security firms often only require the security force to
consult the ship’s captain “if there is time.”166 Otherwise, the
decision when to deploy and use weapons lies with the
contractors.167 This outcome directly conflicts with the
longstanding tradition of the supremacy of the captain while a
ship is at sea.168 The International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), Regulation 34-1 states,

160
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The owner, the charterer, the company operating the ship as defined
in Regulation 1X/1, or any other person shall not prevent or restrict
the master of the ship from taking or executing any decision which,
in the master’s professional judgment, is necessary for the safety of
life at sea and protection of the marine environment.169

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Richard Phillips, captain of the hijacked MV Maersk Alabama
expressed concern with this conflict. He observed,
[V]ery clear protocols would have to be established and followed. For
example, as a captain, I am responsible for the vessel, cargo and
crew at all times, but I am not comfortable giving up command
authority to others, including the commander of a protection force.
In the heat of an attack, there can be only one final decisionmaker.170

Indeed, issues of command and control are crucial and without
Congressional regulations, shipping companies must be careful
in contractually ceding control from their captains to security
contractors.
c. Limiting Liability for Defending the Ship
Related to command and control, shipping companies
and individual private contractors’ liability can stem from
defending a ship. The U.S. House of Representatives is
currently considering a bill that would limit liability for
owners, captains, and mariners for their actions during a
pirate attack. Introduced by Representative Lobiondo in July
2009, the bill currently states,
An owner, operator, time charterer, master, or mariner who uses force,
or authorizes the use of force, to defend a vessel of the United States
against an act of piracy shall not be liable for any injury or death
caused by such force to any person participating in the act of piracy.171

While it is perhaps unlikely for pirates to sue ships for the
injuries, this bill is clear evidence that Congress recognizes
that it can be good policy for ships to employ private security.
Indeed, the deterrent provided by private contractors not only
lessens the burden on the U.S. Navy, but it also keeps
insurance costs down, protects mariners, and decreases the
169

M.S.C. Res. 153(78), Annex 3, Rep. of the Int’l Mar. Org., May 20, 2004,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/432aca724.pdf.
170
Confronting Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 5-6 (2009).
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United States Mariner and Vessel Protection Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 3376,
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likelihood of paying ransoms. Of course, this bill does not relate
to injuries sustained by shipping company employees as a
result of pirate attacks.172
C.

Potential Civil Liability for Shipping Companies

Traveling through pirate-infested waters can also mean
substantial civil liability for a corporation. Following the
hijacking of the MV Maersk Alabama, the ship’s cook, Richard
E. Hicks, brought suit against the ship’s owner, Maersk Line
Ltd., and his employer, Waterman Steamship Corporation.173
Claiming that the defendants failed to take adequate
precautions when sending the ship through the Gulf of Aden,
Hicks sought $75,000 for his injuries and his apprehension
about returning to work.174 Hicks sued for negligence under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,175 the Jones
Act,176 as well as general maritime and common law.177 Hicks’
broad spectrum of claims is clear evidence that shipping
companies must be aware that potential liability—and limits in
liability—for a pirate attack can come from several sources of
law. Three notable statutes of which shipping companies should
be aware are (1) the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 and (2) the Jones Act—both of which were pleaded in the
Hicks case—and (3) the Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act.
1. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) is a
comprehensive piece of legislation that sets forth a host of
responsibilities not only for ship owners and mariners, but also
for the Coast Guard and U.S. Department of Homeland
172
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Security.178 Ship owners are required to take certain measures,
including: designating security officers for the vessel and
company; overseeing proper personnel training; and ensuring
vessel records are kept.179 They must also conduct a Vessel
Security Assessment (VSA) and make a Vessel Security Plan
(VSP) that must be approved by the Coast Guard.180 Approved
vessels are certified with an International Ship Security
Certificate.181 Finally, the MTSA holds owners responsible for
compliance with Coast Guard directives relating to incident
reporting as well as safety and security checks.182
Noncompliance with these regulations can carry a
$25,000 per day civil penalty and can also leave a corporation
vulnerable to negligence claims, as seen in Hicks.183 Maritime
negligence claims are similar to those on land. A plaintiff has
the burden of showing four elements: (1) “[t]he existence of a
duty” that imposes a legal obligation on a person “to protect
others from unreasonable risks”; (2) a “breach of that duty by
engaging in conduct that falls below the applicable standard or
norm”; (3) a “reasonably close causal connection between the
offending conduct and the resulting injury,” i.e., proximate
causation; and (4) injury to the plaintiff.184
Antonio J. Rodriguez, a former U.S. Naval captain and a
current maritime law practitioner, observed that violations of
the MTSA could be considered a breach of the standard to
“protect others from unreasonable risks” and lead to liability.185
Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in The TJ Hooper is a seminal
case in maritime negligence law and is the leading authority on
the widely accepted negligence rules relating to industry safety
practices.186 In The TJ Hooper, two tug boats were deemed
178
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negligent and responsible for the loss of two barges when the
tugs traveled into a storm without radios, which would have
warned them of the storm.187 While having radios on board was
not an accepted industry custom at the time, Judge Hand held
that “proper diligence” would have led the tugs to equip their
ships with the proper safety precautions (i.e., radios).188 He
noted further that regardless of how persuasive an industry
usage, an industry may not establish its own tests for proper
diligence.189 Instead, courts are required to make an objective
determination of reasonable diligence.190
In addition to negligence claims, Rodriguez also notes
that violations of MTSA regulations could create grounds for
negligence per se claims.191 As explained by the Third
Restatement of Torts, a defendant is negligent per se when he
“violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type
of accident [his] conduct causes, and if the accident victim is
within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.”192
As such, a seaman’s injury that stems from a shipping
company’s violation of the MTSA would likely meet this
definition, and the company could be deemed negligent even if
it was acting reasonably.193 Conversely, full compliance with
MTSA regulations and possession of a valid International Ship
Security Certificate could be considered prima facie evidence
that the vessel fulfilled its duty of care.194
In the context of claims arising from pirate attacks, as
seen in the Hicks case, the MTSA regulations in question will
focus on shipping companies’ adequate safety precautions.195 As
the MTSA includes several provisions for ship security, a
plaintiff—likely a shipping company employee—could make a
substantial case for per se negligence.196 Even if the ship has a
valid International Ship Certificate, a plaintiff can look for a
187
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shipping company’s noncompliance with Coast Guard
directives relating specifically to ships traveling in high-risk
waters.197 As mentioned above, violations of Coast Guard
directives are deemed violations of the MTSA.198 Among these
directives is MARSEC199 Directive 104-6 (Rev. 2), which was
issued following the capture of the MV Maersk Alabama. This
directive requires ship owners that travel in high-risk waters
to undertake specific planning to deter and repel pirate
attacks.200 A shipowner’s plan must include:
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Hardening the vessel against intrusions.
Non-lethal methods of repulsing intruders.
Ship operations & maneuvers to evade attack.
Communications procedures: Internal protocol for internal
shipboard communications & external communications before,
during and after the incident.
Protection of the crew.
Procedures to take if the ship’s security is compromised.
Procedures for crew in hostage situations.
Company policy/procedures for confronting intruders.
Training program establishing frequency for drills and exercises.201

Ships must also travel within certain protected corridors of the
Gulf of Aden and provide voyage plans to regional Coast Guard
liaisons.202 While not required, ships are also advised to
establish “safe havens” in which the crew can take refuge
during an attack.203 Also, a ship may rig its hull with nets, soap,
or barbed wire to make it difficult to scale.204
In the case of the MV Maersk Alabama, a Vessel Safety
Plan was submitted by Maersk to the Coast Guard that
included many antipiracy procedures and was ultimately
approved.205 While Hicks has yet to be decided, this certainly
197
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would make a showing of per se negligence based on a violation
of the MTSA less likely. Still, Hicks can prevail under a
“standard” negligence formulation, as Judge Hand applied in
The TJ Hooper.206 This requires the plaintiff to convince a jury
that the ship owner knew or should have known that the
security measures, approved by the Coast Guard, were
insufficient to prevent his injury.207
2. The Jones Act
While the MTSA provides a host of rules and
regulations intended to protect the ship, crew, and cargo, the
Jones Act was intended specifically to ensure shipping
companies provide safe working conditions for seamen.208 Under
the Act, “a seaman injured in the course of employment” can
bring a civil claim against his employer. Specifically,
A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies
from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect
to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against
the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for
personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action
under this section.209

The Fifth Circuit in Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc.
held that an action under the Jones Act requires “a finding
both of negligent breach of duty and proximate cause.”210 While
this ruling might sound like a standard common law
formulation of negligence, the Supreme Court has made clear
that, in passing the Jones Act, “Congress did not mean that the
standards of legal duty must be the same by land and sea.”211 In
fact, the employer’s duty will be construed liberally under the
Jones Act.212
In the context of piracy, the Jones Act puts a heavy
burden on the seaman’s employer to provide a safe working
environment.213 The adequacy of the safety precautions in place
206
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will likely determine whether the burden is met. It is likely
that the satisfaction of MTSA standards will provide at least a
framework for the reasonableness of the precautions. Beyond
protecting the physical well-being of the crew, the Jones Act
also opens the door for lawsuits relating to emotional distress.
As the complaint in Hicks stated, “[p]laintiff sustained and
suffered physical pain, mental anguish.”214
Emotional distress stemming from raids on the high
seas is a fairly unexplored area of the law.215 In 1975, when the
SS Mayaguez was hijacked by the Khmer Rouge off the coast of
Cambodia, members of the crew sued their employer, the ship’s
owner, for negligent infliction of emotional distress.216 The crew
claimed that the ship was negligently piloted too close to the
Cambodian coast.217 The ship’s insurance carrier agreed to pay
the crew without litigating.218 While the case of the SS
Mayaguez was never litigated, recent developments in
negligence law would likely have given the crew a cause of
action. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, the Supreme
Court determined the standard for evaluating claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Federal
Employer’s Liability Act (FELA).219 The court rejected the
“physical impact” test, which only allowed collection of
emotional damages for negligence when it was accompanied by
bodily injury.220 Instead, the court adopted the “zone of danger”
test, which imposes liability not only if there is bodily injury,
but also when the defendant’s conduct puts the plaintiff in
“immediate risk of physical harm.”221
The Ninth Circuit, in Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc.,
addressed claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress in
the Jones Act claim was only against employer Watermen Steamship Corp. and not
against ship owner Maersk Lines Ltd. See Memorandum and Order, supra note 205, at
5 (“The Jones Act provides for negligence remedies in cases where an employeremployee relationship exists, while other maritime causes of action, such as
seaworthiness, create alternative and additional theories of liability.”).
214
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Eric Danoff, Marine Insurance for Loss or Damage Caused by Terrorism or
Political Violence, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 61, 73 (2004).
216
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general maritime law.222 In Chan, a young girl, the daughter of
an employee of the defendant, was on an inflatable raft that
capsized after leaving a cruise ship. She was swept off the raft
but watched two employees perish.223 The court first observed
that, since the Jones Act incorporates FELA, the same
common-law principles that endorse the “zone of danger” test
should apply.224 The court then used the principles of the Jones
Act to determine that the general maritime law also supports
actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress.225 While the
court declined to identify the precise test it used,226 two
important principles were established in Chan. First, the girl’s
witnessing of the two crewmembers dying after being swept off
the raft was sufficient to put her in a zone of danger.227 Second,
the court made particularly clear that the “zone of danger” test
established in Gottshall should also apply to Jones Act cases.228
While the law of emotional damages for hijackings on
the high seas is unclear, emotional damages have been
litigated in the context of airline hijackings.229 These cases
followed a different liability scheme that departed from the
Gottshall standards and might be considered an alternate
framework for ship hijackings by pirates.230 Following the
hijacking of Transworld Airlines Flight 741 in 1970, passengers
brought suit for emotional damages against the airline.231 The
court allowed plaintiffs whose emotional damages stemmed
from bodily injury to collect damages.232 The court’s holding was
not solely based on common law torts; it was also based on the
Warsaw Convention, which regulates liability for the
international carriage of passengers and cargo by commercial
airlines.233 The court observed that the Warsaw Convention
provides a presumption of liability for commercial carriers
while also imposing a cap on damages.234 In a case related to the
222
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same 1970 hijackings, the court pointed out that the liability
regulations set forth by the Convention, originally in 1920,
were to “nurture” the newly developing airline industry by
capping damages to prevent devastating liability.235 To avoid
prejudicing the travelers, who were also taking a risk, the
airline companies were given the presumption of liability.236 The
court noted that, while this scheme may be obsolete, it is still
considered good law.237
There are three key differences between the Jones Act
and the Warsaw Convention’s imposition of liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. First, the Jones Act
requires a more liberal “zone of danger” test, while the Warsaw
Convention, as interpreted by American courts, requires bodily
injury.238 Second, the Warsaw Convention imposes a
presumption of liability on the carrier, while the Jones Act still
requires a showing of negligence.239 Finally, the Warsaw
Convention, and not the Jones Act, greatly caps damages.240
These differences expose shipping companies to greater
potential liability for emotional damages following a hijacking.
Unlike the airlines, shipping companies do not have the benefit
of a liability regime designed to foster growth and decrease risk
to fledgling companies.241 Instead, shipping companies must
rely on careful compliance with federal safety regulations to
avoid negligence and therefore minimize their exposure to
emotional damages.242 Compliance can translate into a
presumption against liability. Still, like the airlines, there were
legal principles established in shipping’s infancy that shipping
companies can use to further limit liability.
3. The Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act
Limiting a ship owner’s liability for acts of the crew
beyond the owner’s contemplation is a longstanding tradition of
235
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common law.243 Following a decision holding a shipping
company liable for smuggling by the ship’s master, several
London merchants petitioned the House of Commons.244 In
response, the House of Commons, in 1734, passed legislation
that aimed “to promote the increase of the number of ships and
vessels” and to prevent “the prejudice of the trade and
navigation of [Great Britain].” The statute required the
“knowledge or privity of the owner” to bring a claim.245
These very same principles were accepted by the U.S.
Congress in the Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act of 1851.246
The Act limits ship owners’ liability for losses arising from
“embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any property, goods, or
merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel, any loss,
damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or thing, loss,
damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred” without
the knowledge or privity of the owner.247 As the House of
Commons and the American judiciary have observed, this
statute is crucial to maintaining and encouraging investment
in the shipping industry by limiting an owner’s risk.248
Most notably, the provisions of the Shipowner’s Limited
Liability Act prevent the owner from assuming liability for the
negligent actions of the crew.249 In Northern Fishing & Trading
Co., Inc. v. Grabowski, the captain of a vessel, which was
seaworthy at the commencement of its voyage, unreasonably
243

Liability Limited, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1912, at XXII. This article examined
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decided not to take shelter from extreme weather conditions.250
The Ninth Circuit held that a ship owner could limit its
liability because the injury resulted from unreasonable conduct
by the captain, and the injury was not proximately caused by
the vessel’s unseaworthiness.251 Relying on the Second Circuit’s
opinion in The 84-H,252 the court reasoned that if no liability is
traceable to the owner and the ship seemed seaworthy at
embarkment,253 then the owner should be completely
exonerated.254 If liability is found but the damage was incurred
without the “privity or knowledge” of the owner, liability
should at least be limited. While it is the plaintiff’s burden to
show the owner’s negligence, if the defendant can show
“seaworthiness at commencement of the voyage,” he is prima
facie entitled to limited liability.255
Similarly, in United States v. MV Big Sam, the pilot of
the tanker MV Big Sam negligently collided with another
tanker.256 Noting that the negligent conduct was beyond the
knowledge and privity of the ship owner, the court released the
owners of the MV Big Sam of any liability.257 Inherent in these
cases is the important limitation that an owner’s failure to
inspect the safety of the vessel and ensure its seaworthiness
will prevent him from limiting liability. In the case of The
Republic, the Second Circuit, drawing on English common law,
held that a ship owner could not invoke the Shipowner’s
Limited Liability Act when he had failed to discover a safety
defect that later caused the accident.258
In addition to the Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act,
ship owners can use martime security regulations and Coast
Guard antipiracy directives as guidance of how to limit their
liability. Even if a shipping company cannot completely
immunize itself against legal accountability, it can use the
certifications and safety plans required by the MTSA to at least
250
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limit its liability. A shipping company that properly files a VSA
and VSP259 and is granted an International Shipping Security
Certificate likely has a strong argument that the ship was safe
and seaworthy at the commencement of its voyage. Similarly, a
shipping company that follows Coast Guard directives and has
implemented safety precautions in the event of pirate attack
would be able to argue that an employee’s deviation from these
plans would be beyond its “privity and knowledge.”260 For
example, if a pilot negligently veers from the protected
passageways and encounters a pirate attack, ship owners
would likely be able to limit liability. Also, if a crewmember
departs from the ship’s procedure of meeting in its established
safe haven, a shipping company might also be able to limit
liability.
Generally, the current liability regime for shipping
companies sets forth an effective “carrot-and-stick” approach. If
shipping companies follow the provisions of the MTSA and the
directives of the Coast Guard, they are given substantial
presumptions against liability that would exonerate them
under the MTSA, the Jones Act, and maritime negligence—or
at least limit their liability. If shipping companies do not follow
these provisions, however, they are subject not only to
substantial presumptions of liability, but also to civil penalties.
As a matter of policy, this approach will have three
important benefits in combating Somali piracy. First, the
refusal to pay ransoms combined with increased security on
ships could help deter acts of piracy without any further
support from states. Second, it promotes stability in shipping
markets. While implementing defensive measures on ships can
be costly up front, shipping companies will be less likely to
have to sporadically pay large ransom payments. Furthermore,
the successful deterrence of pirate attacks could lead to a longterm decrease in costs for shipping companies due to lower
insurance premiums and decreased need to reroute ships.
Third, the current approach emphasizes the safety of the
captain and the crew. Without a strict regime that regulates
the payment and ransoms and ship security measures, the
safety of those aboard would be left to the business judgment of
the ship owner. By imposing substantial penalties and a

259
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considerable liability regime, ship owners effectively must
chose safety.
While this is perhaps an economically inefficient
rationale, the risk of death, injury, and psychological suffering
that comes from a ship’s hijacking is too substantial to justify
this approach. While shipping companies are increasingly
doing their share to combat piracy, another industry stands
ready to profit in eradicating pirates from the Gulf of Aden.
III.

PIRATE HUNTERS

Shipping companies are not the only players in the fight
against piracy. The reemergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden
has sparked an industry of private contractors who stand ready
to not only protect ships from pirate raids, but also to hunt
down pirates.261 As the United States is caught fighting wars
against terrorism and drugs, the military does not have the
assets to adequately protect commercial shipping from pirates.
Commentators suggest the U.S. government should turn to the
private security industry.262 In doing so, however, these private
companies face a host of legal challenges.263 Among the most
notable are the legal authorization to hunt pirates and the
potential criminal and civil liability that these companies could
face.
A.

Historical Context

Reliance on the private sector to hunt down pirates is
not a new concept. Prior to the development of large-scale
navies, countries would commission merchant vessels using
instruments known as “letters of marque and reprisal” to
attack enemy ships.264 These private sailors would come to be
known as “privateers” and the practice of “privateering”
became increasingly commonplace.265 At that time, Algiers alone
had over one hundred ships and thousands of sailors engaged
in privateering.266 Of course, as privateering became more
261

Berube, supra note 113.
See id.
263
See, e.g., id. at 612.
264
Boot, supra note 25, at 98. “Privateering” is “[t]he practice of arming
privately owned merchant ships for the purpose of attacking enemy trading ships.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (8th ed. 2004).
265
Boot, supra note 25, at 96.
266
Id.
262

374

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

commonplace, government attitudes changed toward the
practice, and rather than attack enemy ships, privateers were
hired by countries including Great Britain and the United
States to hunt down pirates.267 Among these privateers was
Captain William Kidd, who, in 1696, received a royal
commission to apprehend specific pirates wanted by King
William III, as well as “all other Pirates, Free-booters, and Sea
Rovers of what Nature soever.”268
B.

Legal Basis for the Letter of Marque

The practice of privateering continued until it was
outlawed by many nations through the 1856 Treaty of Paris
and the 1907 Hague Convention.269 The United States was not
among the signatories of either, and thus has not foreclosed the
possibility of using privateers.270 Still, over the last century, the
letter of marque has fallen out of use, largely due to the
modernization and centralization of war efforts in the
industrialized world.271 This, of course, does not mean that
Congress has lost its power to grant them. As former naval
officer David Douglas Winters observed, “Much like our
Revolutionary War forefathers, we do not have the assets we
need to protect ourselves. They found an answer, and
fortunately they preserved it for us: privateers.”272
Indeed, letters of marque were an important part of
American life at the founding.273 During the Constitutional
Convention, the inclusion of a Congressional power to grant
letters of marque was among the few powers on which the
federalists and antifederalists could agree.274 Article I, Section 8
states in relevant part that “[t]he Congress shall have power . . .
[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”275
Exercising this power, Congress passed 33 U.S.C. § 386:
267
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The President is authorized to instruct the commanders of the
public-armed vessels of the United States, and to authorize the
commanders of any other armed vessels sailing under the authority
of any letters of marque and reprisal granted by Congress, or the
commanders of any other suitable vessels, to subdue, seize, take,
and, if on the high seas, to send into any port of the United States,
any vessel or boat built, purchased, fitted out, or held as mentioned
in section 385 of this title (pirate vessels).276

As such, the President is authorized to enlist private citizens
granted letters of marque to seize pirate vessels on the high
seas.277 Individuals granted letters of marque are given
significant authority to engage in hostilities against pirates.278
The letter of marque would allow the ship to bear arms, and
upon the capture of pirates, the ship’s master would be
permitted to arrest the pirates and seize the pirates’ vessel.279 To
preserve this authority, the ship must have received a completed
letter of marque that identifies the vessel and its master.280 In
addition, the master would be liable for the actions of his crew
and responsible both for keeping detailed records and for
complying with American and international humanitarian law.281
Ships that exceed the bounds of their commission would lose
these privileges and be punished as pirates.282
Commentators suggest that the modern privateer would
be able to work within these limitations while taking
advantage of cutting-edge technology, a faster procurement
process, and a more flexible organizational structure, as
compared to the government.283 In 2005, the Department of
Defense spent one third of its total budget on private
contractors, and therefore it has the infrastructure and
expertise to properly manage privateers.284 Much like military
contractors in Iraq, privateers would be connected by a
command/intelligence fusion center that could be operated by
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the Coast Guard.285 Drawing further parallels to Iraq, Professor
Berube suggests that letters of marque may not even be
necessary to employ private contractors.286 Instead, he suggests,
private contractors could be used to fill gaps in the United
States’ overly stretched naval deployment, in tandem with an
embedded Coast Guard Officer aboard to ensure compliance
with international law.287
The employment of modern day privateers in the Gulf of
Aden could lead to substantial improvement in the security of
the region and represents a lucrative new niche for the private
security establishment. Companies have already invested
heavily in this prospect; for example, Blackwater Worldwide
recently developed its antipiracy ship, the MacArthur.288 Still,
the risks to these companies are great.289 The law of
privateering has been consistent, and privateers who exceed
the bounds of their commissions risk being arrested and
subjected to severe penalties for piracy.290 This risk would likely
be even greater for contractors that are not commissioned.
Unlike private contractors on land, private contractors on the
high seas can be deemed pirates by any nation, and arrested
and prosecuted.291 As such, it would be in the best interests of
both private contractors and the U.S. government to grant
letters of marque to private contractors before partnering with
them in fighting piracy.
C.

Limitations on the Letter of Marque and Criminal
Sanctions

Letters of marque can and have placed strict limitations
on the actions of privateers, and the American legal system has
several mechanisms to deal with those that go beyond the
bounds of a letter of marque.292 Many of these limitations were
noted by Justice Story in The Amiable Isabella, one of the most
285
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well-known cases in the realm of letters of marque.293 Story laid
out several statutory restrictions that come with an issuance of
a letter of marque. Notably, the Prize Act of 1812, as cited by
Justice Story, states, “[A ship’s master is] to give bond, and is
made responsible for his own misconduct and that of the crew;
is to receive and execute the President’s instructions; [and] is to
keep a journal of the ship’s transactions.”294 Failure to abide by
these instructions would result in forfeiture of the commission
and the rights to any prize.295 The Prize Act of 1812 further
required ships to abide by the laws and treaties of the United
States and to be responsible for any injuries beyond the
purposes of the vessel.296 As mentioned above, violation of these
293

In his opinion, Justice Story reproduces the entire letter of marque:

James Madison, President of the United States of America, to all who shall
see these presents, greeting: Be it known, that in pursuance of an act of
Congress, passed on the 26th day of June, one thousand eight hundred and
twelve, I have commissioned, and by these presents do commission, the
private armed schooner called the Roger, of the burthen of 184 tons, or
thereabouts, owned by Thomas E. Gary, Hy. Gary, James B. Cogbill & Co.,
Brogg & Jones, Hannon & High, Robert Ritchie, Robert Birchett, John
Wright, Wm. C. Boswell, Samuel Turner, John G. Heslop, Wm. & Charles
Carling, Thomas Shoe, Richard B. Butte, Richard Drummond, Littlebury
Estambuck, John Davis, Spencer Drummond, Peter Nestell, and Roger
Quarles, mounting fourteen carriage guns, and navigated by ninety men,
hereby authorizing Captain—, and John Davis, Lieutenant of the said
Schooner Roger, and the other officers and crew thereof, to subdue, seize, and
take any armed or unarmed British vessel, public or private, which shall be
found in the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the
high seas, or within the waters of the British dominions, and such captured
vessel, with her apparel, guns and appurtenances, and the goods or effects
which shall be found on board the same, together with all the British persons
and others, who shall be found acting on board, to bring within some port of
the United States; and also to retake any vessels, goods, and effects, of the
people of the United States, which may have been captured by any British
armed vessels, in order that proceedings may be had concerning such capture
or recapture, in due form of law, and as to right and justice shall appertain.
The said _____ is further authorized to detain, seize, and take all vessels and
effects, to whomsoever belonging, which shall be liable thereto, according to
the law of nations, and the rights of the United States, as a power at war,
and to bring the same within some port of the United States, in order that
due proceedings may be had thereon-this commission to continue in force
during the pleasure of the President of the United States, for the time being.
Given under my hand, and the seal of the United States of America, at the
City of Washington, the 24th day of April, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and thirteen, and of the Independence of the said
States the thirty-seventh. (Signed) JAMES MADISON. By the President,
(Signed) JAMES MONROE, Secretary of State.
Id. at 2-3.
294
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requirements would leave the privateer vulnerable to arrest
and prosecution for piracy.297
1. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
In addition to these longstanding consequences, Congress
has passed legislation relating to the conduct of private
contractors in response to the use of private contractors during
the war in Iraq. The key piece of legislation relating to criminal
liability for private contractors is the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 2000.298 In relevant part, the Act states that
anyone who “engages in conduct outside the United States that
would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year if the conduct had been engaged in within
the . . . jurisdiction of the United States” while employed or
accompanying the Armed Forces or as a member of the armed
forces “shall be punished for the offense.”299
Recently, the actions of private contractors in Iraq have
greatly broadened the scope of the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 2000. The most notable cases relate to the
shootings in Nissour Square, Baghdad, Iraq, in September
2007.300 While providing security for U.S. Embassy personnel,
Blackwater contractors improperly opened fire in the open
square, leaving fourteen Iraqis dead.301 One of the contractors,
Jeremy Ridgeway, has pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter
in a federal district court in the District of Columbia302 based on
allegations that he “was employed by the Armed Forces outside
the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act).”303 This determination made
Ridgeway subject to the laws of the United States.304 Five of
Ridgeway’s colleagues were also indicted for voluntary
manslaughter and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1).305
297
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The precedent established in the Ridgeway case could
have strong ramifications for potential criminal liability for
individual private contractors in the Gulf of Aden. In addition
to risking potential prosecution for piracy, these contractors
can be convicted for violating American law under the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000.306 As seen in the case
of the Blackwater guards, there is an additional risk of severe
penalties if the guards are armed with automatic weapons—a
circumstance that could expose them to aggravating sentencing
factors.307 As such, it is crucial for private security companies to
properly stay within the bounds of their commissions and have
clear mechanisms for command and control, both of which
ensure compliance with American law. Failure to do so could
lead to not only criminal penalties for their employees, but also
civil liability for their organizations.
2. Civil Liability
Like the imposition of criminal liability using the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, the United States’
use of private contractors in Iraq has also led to new
developments in civil liability for private contractors.308 The
current framework for civil liability was born out of the Abu
Ghraib prison scandal.309 Following the scandal, a class of Iraqi
prisoners brought private actions against two contractors who
provided translation and interrogation support—Titan Corp.
and CACI International, Inc. (“CACI”)—for their roles in the
scandal.310 The Iraqis brought suit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia under the Alien Tort Statute, the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01blackwater.html. Not addressing the merits
of the charges, District Judge Urbina held that statements taken from the defendants
by the government violated their rights against self-incrimination. Id.
306
18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267.
307
Guard’s Plea Led to Blackwater Indictments, supra note 300. Since the
guards committed their crimes using machine guns, they were subject to thirty year
mandatory minimums. Id.
308
See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
309
See id. at 1. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal refers to allegations of torture
and mistreatment of prisoners perpetrated by United States Army interrogators in an
Iraqi prison beginning in 2004. The United States Military investigated the private
contracting firms Titan Corp. and CACI International, Inc. Julian Borger, U.S.
Military in Torture Scandal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2004/apr/30/television.internationalnews.
310
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2.
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and state tort law claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.311
The district court dismissed the federal claims, and the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.312 Dismissing
the liability claim under the Alien Tort Statute, the court held
that the actions of the defendants, while under the color of
state authority, were still done by private actors (not official
actors) and therefore were not actionable.313 Dismissing the
RICO claim, the court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to seek civil remedies under the Act because they could not
allege damage to business or property.314
Turning to the merits of the state tort law claims, the
district court had to determine whether the defendants were
exempt from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.315 The
district court granted summary judgment for Titan Corp.,
holding that, since its command structure was fully integrated
with that of the military, its employees were “soldiers in all but
name,” and therefore it fell under the “combatant activities”
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act.316 This exception
provides tort immunity for defendants “under the direct
command and exclusive operational control of the military
chain of command” who are “engaged in ‘activities both
necessary to and in direct connection with actual hostiles.’”317
By contrast, the district court held that CACI was not entitled
to summary judgment, since it granted its managers additional
discretion and supervision over their employees, thus creating
dual chains of command.318
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, reversed the District
Court’s denial of summary judgment as to CACI and affirmed
311

Id. at 3; see also D.C. Circuit Rules that Preemption Requires Dismissal of
Tort Claims Against Battlefield Contractors, 51 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 35, Sept. 23, 2009,
at ¶ 324. The Federal Tort Claims Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006). The
Act regulates tort liability and immunity for employees of the federal government. See
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 186, at 440-41.
312
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2.
313
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Ibrahim
v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005)). Saleh and Ibrahim were both
prisoners and both brought suit against Titan and CACI. Since their cases followed the
same facts, the cases were consolidated for discovery purposes. As such, various case
citations will refer to Saleh or Ibrahim as the named plaintiff. Both citations refer to
the same litigation. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
314
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006); Saleh, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (citing Ibrahim,
391 F. Supp. 2d at 10).
315
Ibrahim, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 3-4.
316
Id.
317
Id. at 4 (citing Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948)).
318
Id. at 10-11.
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summary judgment as to Titan Corp.319 The court rejected the
District Court’s use of a narrow “direct command and exclusive
operational control” test as inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent and bad policy.320 The D.C. panel noted that the
court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. stood for
broader protection of the federal interests inherent in the
exceptions to the Federal Torts Claims Act.321 In Boyle, the
Court struck down the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that a
contractor who was minimally involved in the design of a
military helicopter did not fall within the “discretionary
function” exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act.322 The
Boyle court made clear that government officials were still
involved in making judgments about the design and therefore
the tort claims were barred.323
The D.C. Circuit in Saleh made similar findings. The
court noted that freeing military commanders from worrying
about potential tort claims when planning operations is a
significant federal interest inherent in the “combatant activities”
exception.324 Drawing on Boyle, the court agreed that even
“limited influence on an operation” supports the interest in
baring claims.325 The court further noted, as a matter of policy,
that contractors would be less inclined to report abuses to their
superiors and the government.326 The panel referred to the
District Court’s recognition that contractors had to report abuses
up both the corporate and military chains as evidence of a dual
chain of command.327 Instead, the court set forth a broader test
for preemption under “combatant activities” exception:
During wartime, where a private service contractor is integrated into
combatant activities over which the military retains command
authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in such
activities shall be preempted. We recognize that a service contractor
might be supplying services in such a discrete manner—perhaps even in
a battlefield context—that those services could be judged separate and
apart from combat activities of the U.S. military.328
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Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 8-9.
Id. (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988)).
Id. (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513).
Id. (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 9.

382

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

Applying this test, the panel reversed and held that both Titan
and CACI were exempt from the state tort claims.329
Working under the color of American authority enables
both criminal and civil sanctions to be brought against private
contractors in the Gulf of Aden. To avoid civil liability, private
contractors must heed the test established in Saleh. Beyond a
commission, private security companies must insist on being
integrated into the military’s antipiracy operations. Integration
into the command structure not only helps to limit civil liability,
but as Professor Berube points out, it allows private contractors
to share intelligence and the military to effectively coordinate
operations.330 Even with full integration, there is no guarantee
that courts will consider combating piracy a “wartime” activity,
and therefore leave private security firms open to liability.331 As
such, just as Congress is attempting to pass legislation that
limits the liability of ship owners when defending their ships,332
Congress should also pass legislation that limits liability of
private contractors who actively hunt for pirates.
CONCLUSION
The reemergence of pirates as a significant threat to
commercial shipping is forcing the legal systems of the world to
adapt. Since the United States cannot devote naval resources
to protecting the merchant fleet the way it once could, it should
craft policy and legislation that enables the private sector to
fight piracy. The United States should continue to provide
incentives for shipping companies to adequately protect their
ships through increased exposure to civil liability, while
attempting to regulate the paying of ransoms. This approach
would deter pirate attacks, promote stability in shipping
markets, and protect mariners from being looted, kidnapped,
and ransomed. The United States should also look to private
contractors to supplement its naval presence in the Gulf of
Aden. These contractors can be regulated by an evolving legal
regime that includes centuries-old, common-law principles as
well as recent developments, both of which ensure criminal and
civil sanctions for contractors who go beyond the bounds of
329

Id. at 10-11.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
331
The test set forth in Saleh is prefaced with the clause “[i]n wartime.”
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9.
332
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
330
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their commissions. Following these two approaches, the United
States can ensure the safety of its shipping industry while
preserving its military commitments around the globe.
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